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This paper is concerned with those criteria by which enemy
ballistic missiles are threat ordered. A questionnaire was sent
to Army Air Defense officers at two senior service schools to
elicit their opinions. The questionnaires were analyzed using
Kendall's coefficient of concordance. Relative weights were
determined for each criteria.
A linear model was developed using selected criterion and
their relative weights. The number of interceptors was fixed.
A sample problem shows how one might use the linear model to
determine which ballistic missile to engage first. The number
of interceptors to be fired at a threat is discussed and a
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1. INTRODUCTION
The role of Air Defense in the furtherance of national
security is as follows:
(1) Detection of potential threat objects
(2) Identification of unknown objects
(3) Interception of enemy forces
(4) Destruction of the hostile threat [Ref. 4, p. 4]
Thus a threat is detected, identified, intercepted, and last
destroyed or neutralized. Although these national security
objectives are concerned with the aircraft threat, these ob-
jectives are no less appropriate to the missile threat.
A. CURRENT SYSTEM
Our current system is designed primarily as a defense against
the air-supported threat. The nerve center of the current system
is built around the AiJ/GSG-5 (V), BIRDIE system. This is a fire
distribution system which directs the flow of information between
the Army Air Defense Command Post(AADCP), individual batteries and
the flORAD division direction center.
The necessary control, indicators, and display equipment are
located in the AADCP and enable the controller to make or delete
target assignments to the firing batteries. But over the last
few years this assignment problem has been and will be greatly
increased by the advent of the ICBff, the SLBM, the MIRV, and the
FOBS. A tremendous research effort has been and is currently
studying the different methods of countering these threats.
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Even assuming that some type of ABM system is in existance to
counter these threats, a number of operational problems pertaining
to the four Air Defense roles still remain. This paper will investigate
a particular problem that arises in carrying out the interception role
of the Air Defense mission.
B. PROBLEM AND SCOPE
The purpose of this paper is to determine criteria by which an
enemy ballistic missile threat during an attack can best be measured
and to develope a method weighting these factors so that priorities
may be established for the destruction of enemy missiles. At this
point in time, an enemy threat will likely be made up of a combination
of aircraft, both manned and unmanned, ICBM's, MIRV's, FOBS ' s , and
SLBM's. This would be under an all out attack.
A typical attack would most likely be phased. One could first
expect nuclear burst's above the atmosphere to create a radar
blackout condition. Next would come a simultaneous ballistic missile
attack from both the sea and space. Manned aircraft would then follow
up the ballistic missile attack.
This paper will address only the threat imposed by a missile
attack of the ICBM type. The assumption is made that this type
missile will be on a trajectory course and that no evasive action
will take place. The problem has been identified as one of "threat
ordering and evaluation" by Dr. John 0. F. Dorsett. [5] The central
theme is that the threats are to be ranked or ordered by some pro-
cedure.
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The goal of threat ordering is to lower the expected damage from
a nuclear attack by efficient allocation of ABM resources. Threat
ordering can be motivated by the following simple model. This static
model ignores the dynamics of combat, i. e., it looks at a nuclear
attack during the whole time of the battle.
N
m n.











N = total number of enemy ballistic missiles
m w
D. = damage that i - th BM can produce
P = single shot kill probability
n. = number of interceptors that are to be fired
1
at the i - th BM.
Although this model is simplified and will not be explicitly
solved, it does clearly indicate that there should be at least one
interceptor fired at each BM. Examination of the model shows that
there are two ways to increase system effectiveness, i. e., reduce
expected damage. First, one could try to increase P . But P is
expected to be quite high at the start, say at least above .90.
Thus any marginal increase in P would most likely not be offset
by the marginal cost of obtaining the increase. The second area
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of interest would be to increase M, i.e., have a large number of
interceptors available. The assumption made in this paper is that
M is two or three times greater than N .
m
Thus one sees that an effective ABM system would probably be
characterized as having a large number of interceptors in relation
to estimated enemy missile strengths. Unfortunately, the number
of interceptors that can be simultaneously deployed is limited by the
number of interceptor control radars. A very complicated allocation
problem then arises. Allocation here refers to the proper use of the
interceptor control radar's time. This is essentially a sequencing
problem. Threat ordering is one method of determining priorities
for the deployment of interceptors.
As a first pass in looking at this sequencing problem, the
allocation of interceptors to various BM's during a specific time
period within an attack will be examined. A raid band, to be defined
later, will be the time period used in the nonlinear programming
model to be developed.
More precisely the problem this paper will examine is that
within the framework of a ballistic missile attack:
(1) What criteria should be used to order the threats?
(2) What weight should be assigned to each criteria?
One can start by looking at the overall picture and then scaling
it down to a workable size. The ideas that pertain to just one site
or complex are essentially just as valid as when applied to the whole
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system. The passing of information between defended areas is an
intergral part of this overall problem, but will only be discussed
when it is of importance to the above defined problem.
This passing of information is a command and control problem,
but the important information would be that pertaining to threat
ordering and would normally be made up from radar inputs. Also
those defenses first encountered by an attack may have a more
difficult task in so far as they must determine which ballistic
missiles they must shoot down and which they can afford to let
pass into subsequent defended areas. Those defenses at the termina-
tion of a ballistic trajectory will not really be concerned with
this problem, since they must shoot down e\/ery incoming missile.
We can consider ABM complexes located throughout the country.
An example is shown in Figure 1. Each circle represents a
defended area consisting of several radars, a control and computer
center, and missile batteries. For this problem, our discussion
will be based on just one of these defended areas. Thus all
ballistic missiles whose trajectories are predicted to impact in
say, area A, will concern us. This could mean that the theortical
maximum capability that the defense could be expected to have
would be the destruction of all threats both passing through the
defended area and those intended for the area. But those passing
over the area would essentially be attacked in the same manner as











Threat ordering consists of looking at all the incoming missiles
and determining which one constitutes the largest threat and then
taking a defensive action, e.g., fire two missiles. To accomplish
this threat ordering, the determination of the criteria and the
relevant weight of these criteria is required before the threat
can be ranked as to the highest threat, next highest, etc.
But one may ask the question, "Why take time to rank them at
all when you come under attack? Why not just shoot them down on
a first come, first serve basis?" This may seem quite plausible
at first and is satisfactory when the threat is made up wholly
of aircraft. In this situation there is time available in which
to make a decision, look at the probable results of that decision,
and alter the decision if necessary.
Now when a missile threat is considered, this precious time
is lost. It is of utmost importance that threat ordering be done
rapidly and accurately because of the short warning times. An
automated system with a near real time processing capability is
required. Any so-called decision making by the computer will
require that the most important criteria and their relative weights
be automatically incorporated into our defensive system at each
moment of time. A controller will not have time to point at a
radar scope and direct fire units at a specific threat or even
direct that the semi-automatic fire distribution system (AN/TSQ051)
perform this duty. The firing doctrine, however simple, will have
to be automatic.
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Another important consideration that certainly warrants any
time spent on this problem does not concern the defensive capability,
but that of the offensive force. It is feasible to consider the
idea that the ABM system could serve as an input into our own ICBM
network and on evaluation of threat provide the time to fire our
own ICBM's. In other words, the ABM system would serve as an
additional warning net to our offensive forces. Analysis of
missile threat ordering would be a prime function.
C. PLAN OF STUDY
The plan of this study is to first find out which criteria
are important and which should be used. Next a questionnarie con-
taining the criteria will be sent to the Air Defense Officers at
the Army War College and the Army Command and General Staff' College
where selected criteria will be ranked. The questionnaires will
then be analyzed using Kendall's coefficient of concordance to
determine the degree of agreement concerning the criterial. A few
simple threat functions will be discussed. A sample problem will
be developed showing how these functions can be used by the computer
to order ballistic missile threats.
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II. SELECTION OF THREAT CRITERIA AND WEIGHTS
As already alluded to one might be quick to say that the closest
missile to the defended area should be fired at first. But what
if the one just following has a larger yield and/or is directed at a
higher priority target? A problem then exists as to which should
be destroyed first in order to minimize overall damage. Also in
this case, if there were only a few missiles remaining or another
wave were expected, one would most likely want to fire at the larger
yield, higher priority type BM's first. Thus more than one criteria
need be used to determine the greatest threat. Another way of
stating this is that one is interested in finding out what procedure
to use for allocating interceptors to incoming enemy BM that will
minimize the damage to the defended area and/or the country as a
whole.
A. CRITERIA SELECTION
The first method looked at to determine how to arrive at the
proper threat criteria was suggested by Churchman. [Ref. 3,
p. 136-153]. This method makes use of criteria ranking by a panel
of experts. The selection of the initial criteria to be looked
at is the result of the considered opinion of a responsible panel.
The panel is asked to make an initial ranking of the criteria.
This is done on an individual basis. Then a series of comparisons
is made by the panel as a whole. The use of group opinion in the
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ranking method is accomplished by accepting a majority rule on each
comparison and regarding the collective decision as a single response,
Then the criteria included are specifically defined to provide for
equivalent comparisons among the members of the panel. Decisions
are made by open ballot, but discussion of the specific responses
is prohibited. The periodic adjustment conforming to each vote is
performed in full view of the participating panel.
This method in its original form was not suitable for this study,
since assembling a panel of experts was not possible. The question-
naire method was used. The questionnaire is shown in Appendix A.
The criteria have been written for the general case and not for any
particular scenario.
The first criteria on, denoted CI, has the effect of predicting
the yield of the BM. As the analysis of radar cross-section is well
developed, [Ref. 1, p. 51] a rough estimate can be made of the
BM's yield. From the yield a determination of how large an area
will be destroyed can be made. For example, if the radar picks up
a BM with a cross-sectional area of .5 meters, then it might be
estimated to be a 50 kiloton warhead, and thus have the ability to
destroy an area of 10 square miles.
The second criterion, the BM's range from the defended area,
denoted C2, is concerned with the range from the closest firing unit
within the defended area. Another equivilant meaning is the distance
in time, say in seconds, before the BM would impact in the defended
area.
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The third criterion is the value of the impact area to the
United States and is denoted C3.
To make use of the impact criteria, the idea of isocost or
value contour lines are introduced. These lines will be used to
high light those areas of the greatest population concentration,
industrial areas, and offensive missile locations. These contour
lines would be used to give two or three rough orders of magnitude
as to the loss that would be incured if a missile hit that particular
area. For example, look at the defended area A in figure 2.
Figure 2. Single ABM Complex
I he area having a value of 1 would be equal to 1 million people
or have a property value of 100 mil ion dollars. Area 2 would be
worth twice this amount and area 3 would be three times this. These
.
This value can also be interpreted on a strategic level. Of
strategic value to the United States would be the types of skills
possessed by the people in an area. This is vital for the re-
generation of our system in a post-nuclear strike environment. It
1s important that a "balanced profile" of survivor skills be present
after a nuclear exchange. Stanford Research Institute and the RAND
Corporation have done studies along these lines.
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lines could be put into a computer routine, so that they could be
changed rapidly when a change in value was noted, such as after
our ICBM's were launched or a sizeable amount of the population
had moved out of a city. These values will most certainly help in
ordering BM threats. The criteria is denoted C4.
The last criteria concerning the number of batteries is also
self-explanatory and is denoted C5.
The questionnaires were sent out to the aformentioned Army
schools. After the questionnaires were returned, the 5 weights
were ranked on a scale from 1 to 5. The results of the original
weights are shown in Appendix C and the results in a ranked form
are shown in Table 1 and 2.
B. RANKING PROCEDURE AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING
In order to determine how the criteria should be ranked, and if
they can be ranked, the Kendall coefficient of concordance was
used. [Ref. 10, p229-239]. The degree of agreement among the k_
judges is reflected by the degree of variance among the n_ sum of
ranks. W, the coefficient of concordance, is a function of that
degree of variance.
The method is to first find the sum of ranks, R., in each
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RANKED THREAT DATA FOR AWC
Judge CI C2 C3 C4 C5
(yield) (time) (# of inter)(Impact) (# of batt)
1 4 1.5 3 5 1.5
2 1 4 3 5 2
3 3 4 1.5 5 1.5
4 3 4 1.5 5 1.5
5 1 2 5 3 4
6 1 5 3 4 2
7 4 5 3 2 1
8 4 5 2 3 1
9 5 3 1.5 4 1.5
Sum 26 33.5 23.5 36 16
TABLE 2
RANKED THREAT DATA FOR C & GS
Judge CI C2 C3 C4 C5
1 2 1 5 3 4
2 1 3 4.5 4.5 2
3 1 3 5 2 4
4 3 1 5 2 4
5 3 5 2 4 1
6 1 5 3 4 2
7 1 4 3 5 2
8 1 5 3 4 2
9 3 5 4 2 1
10 1 5 3 4 2
11 4 3 2 5 1
12 5 3 1.5 4 1.5
13 1 4.5 3 4.5 2
14 3 4 2 5 1
15 3 5 1 4 2
Sum 33 56.5 47.5 57 31.5
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S = E V ER."ifj
k = number of judges
N = number of criteria ranked, i.e., 5
j2 K
2 (N 3 -N) = the sums which would occur with perfect
agreement among k^ rankings
The results are shown in table 3. For example, let us
TABLE 3
RESULTS OF THREAT ANALYSIS USING
KENDALL'S COEFFICIENT OF CONCORDANCE
W level H
Army War College












examine the results from the Army War College. Since the observed
value of the test statistic, i.e. W, is greater than the critical
value for a = 0.05, one can conclude that the agreement among the
9 judges is higher than it would be by chance. The probability under
the null hypothesis (H ) associated with the observed value of W
enables one to reject the H , that the judges ratings are unrelated
to each other. Here W = .324 expresses the degree of agreement
among the 9 judges in ranking the 5 criteria.
Siegel states that a significant value of W can be interpreted
as meaning that the judges are applying essentially the same standard
in ranking the N objects under study. W has a range from to 1
,
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where 1 would mean perfect agreement. Siegel goes on to state that
often their pooled ordering may serve as a "standard", especially
when there is no relevant external criteria for ordering the objects
[Ref. 10, p 238]. It should be noted that a significant value of
W does not mean that the orderings observed are correct but merely
that the judges agree. It is possible that a variety of judges
can agree in ordering criteria because they use the "wrong" reasons.
This, of course, is a critical problem and is what really makes it
difficult in assigning proper weights to the criterion.
For this study, if one accepts the criteria which the various
judges have agreed upon in ranking the 5 entities, then the best
estimate of the "true" ranking of those entities according to that
criteria is provided by the order of the sums of ranks.
In all three samples, C4 was ranked first. C2 was ranked
second. Also the number of batteries able to fire at the BM, C5,
ranked last. A problem arose in the ranking of the two criteria,
CI and C3. From the data received these two have almost equal
ranking. In the pooled data from the Army War College and the
Command and General Staff College, C3 outranks CI. But this
nearly equal ranking would seem to imply that more knowledge is
really required before the criteria can be ranked. If a scenario
were written for different type attacks, then it most certainly
would be easier to rank the criteria.
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In the next chapter where threat functions are developed the
first through the fourth criterion, CI, C2, C3, and C4 will be
used. After examining the criteria more closely and the written
comments, certainly the number of batteries able to fire at a BM,
C5, is related to the number of interceptors that we can launch.
This is now realized as a poor criteria.
Thus the criteria and their ranking to be used in the remainder





Yield of weapon(warhead size as determined by radar
cross section)
C2
BM's range from the defended area of time to
impact
C3
Number of interceptors that we can launch at a BM
before it detonates
C4
Predicted point of BM detonation
major criteria that should be used in ranking an incoming BM attack.
Combining the data from both the AWC and the C & GS, the
contribution that each criterion makes to the total can be determined
This is accomplished by dividing the sum of each particular criteria
by the grand total of all columns, 312.5. For example the yield, CI,
contributes 59/312.5 or .19 of the threat weight. The others are
C2 = .29, C3 = .22, and C4 = .30.
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Some of the major criteria that the officers added to the
questionnaires note mentioning. The criterion listed most often
was the value of the target under attack. But this would be con-
sidered to be the same as the predicted point of BM detonation.
The total number of BM's was also listed and it would appear that
this might be of some importance. The number of interceptors that
could be controlled at any one time is related to the total number
of BM's that would have to be evaluated. It is reasonable to
assume that the process of evaluating, say 8 BM would take more
than twice as much time as evaluating only 4 BM.
The predicted point of intercept is another criterion listed.
This would be used to make burst locator diagrams which would be
helpful in the placement of batteries. But once the batteries
have been placed, then it is the number of interceptors that can
be fired that is really important.
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III. THREAT FUNCTIONS
Once criteria have been selected and the relative weights
have been assigned, they must be combined in some type of
mathematical model. This is so that the BM of greatest threat
can be determined, then the BM of the next greatest threat, etc.
A. LINEAR MODEL
The first method and the simpliest threat weight function
(TW) is a linear combination of the criteria and its associated
value,
TW(j)
-^ C. V. {1)




Vl = value of yield in kilotons
V2 = value of time before impact in seconds
V3 = value of no. of interceptors to be fired
V4 = value of predicted point of impact
TW(j) = threat weight for the j-th BM
Now this threat weight has meaning only for one defense area
and not for any individual battery. That ballistic missile
determined to have the highest threat would then be fired upon
first. In order to have the total threat weight value make sense,
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some of the individual weights have to be negative, i.e., they
have the effect of downgrading the threat. For example if more
interceptors are fired at an incoming BM, the expected damage
would decrease.
Now it is assumed that a computer would be evaluating the
BM's threat continually in real time. Thus the data, such as
the yield and the predicted impact would be continually updated.
Only those BM within the range of the interceptors would be threat
ordered, but of course all BM would be tracked.
Then once the greatest threat is determined, it will be en-
gaged. The computer will again select the greatest threat from
those remaining. The order may have changed of those remaining
BM because of the updated data. Some of this undated information
could be coming from other defense complexes or Air Force radars.
Equation (1) in its present form is unsatisfactory, since it is
dimensionally inhomogenous, i.e., combines kilotons with time until
impact. This may be remedied by normalizing the threat values for
the four criteria to a scale on which the value for each criterion
is a number between and 1. There is no unique way of doing this.
A linear scale on which the minimum value of threat corresponds to
and the maximum to 1 seems reasonable as a first attempt. If the
values are scaled in this manner, the equation is,
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4TW(j) = Z C.
i=l
n
Vi - V .min
V.max-V.min (2)
where Ci = same as equation 1
V. = same as equation 1
V.min = minimum value of the V.,s
V.max = maximum value of the V.,s
TW(j) = threat weight for the j-th BM.
In order for these values to make sense when summed, a sign
convention must be used. Specifically the predicted impact
value and yield will be entered as positive values and the time
to impact and number of missiles to be fired will have negative
weights.
Now if it is not desirable to use the number of missiles avail-
able to fire in determining the largest threat, equation (2) can
be used with the missile criteria deleted, and then readjust the
remaining criteria. These readjusted values are:
CI = yield of BM, .25
C2 = time to impact, .37
C3 = impact point, .38
It is noted these criteria values will always add up to 1.00.
Once the largest threat has been determined, the number of missiles
needed to fire can be determined and thresholds can be set up to
allocate these interceptor resourses. More concerning this area
will be discussed in the next section.
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If this method is used, a threat weight equation in explicit
form is,




Where V. is scaled on a to 1 interval as in
equation (2)
TW.(j) = threat weight of the j-th BM.
In the next chapter a sample problem is shown. It shows how
these equations might be used to threat order BM's with the aid
of a computer.
B. INTERCEPTORS TO BE FIRED
The determination of how many missiles are to be fired is a
criitieal area of threat ordering. It would be reasonable to say
that a BM is too destructive to contemplate letting any come
through the defense. This implies shooting at least one ABM
interceptor at every BM if at all possible. If each missile has
a single shot kill probability of P , then one can determine how
many missiles must be fired to attain a specific protection
level. In probability terms this would be,






P. = probability BM will not penetrate defense
P = single shot kill probability
N = no. of interceptors fired
The reader is reminded that this equation is valid when the
effects of each interceptor are independent. Thus, for example,,
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if P = .90, two interceptors must be fired to attain a probability
of .99 that the defense will not be penetrated. A system with a
.95 to .99 effectiveness would be considered a practical objective.
With a P of .90, two interceptors would have to be fired to
obtain a .99 coverage. But this does not necessarily mean that
two interceptors would have to be fired at the same time. If
time allows, the first interceptor can be launched, the results
noted and then another launched if required. The defense would
know that this one remaining interceptor was allocated for that
BM until either used or found to be not needed. Also it might
turn out that one or two more interceptors have to be fired if
there is still time and the threat caused by that BM is still
large enough.
If one even assumes a P of .95, two interceptors are
required to attain an effective coverage of .99. So the number
of interceptors to be fired at each BM will be set at two for
the sample problem in the next chapter and will remain constant.
As an extension to having a minimum of two interceptors
allocated for each BM, this rule might have to change under the
following conditions. Suppose intelligence has told us that we
can expect to receive 40 BM's attacking the defended area. If
upon attack, only 20 BM's are detected, then cause would exist to
possibly expect a second wave. In a case such as this the defense
may not decide to shoot at each BM. Those predicted to land in
sparsely populated and/or low valued areas would be let through
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so as to be sure interceptors were still available for a possible
second wave. This type of consideration will not be pursued further,
but it does seem worthy of future research.
One may feel that an assignment of two interceptors to each BM
is too arbitrary. Recall that a BM is too destructive to allow
any to get through and there is evidence that three interceptors
will be available for each BM. [Ref. 1, p. 44]. But it is apparent
that a better defensive job could be done if the interceptors were
allocated with some type of cost or priority in mind. Now recall
that it has been assumed there are enough interceptors and that
the control radars are the real constraining factors. So the
problem is that given a certain number of control radars, how
should they be used to control interceptors against an attack in
such a way that damage will be minimized?
The same four basic criteria may be used in a model for the
allocation of interceptors and control radars. The criterion
time to impact is used to place the incoming BM's into so-called
raid points or, more appropriately, raid bands. Raid bands are
time zones of equal length where the time means time to impact
for a BM. For example, all those BM's 100 to 150 seconds from
impact would be threat ordered first, if this was the first time
zone in which BM's were encountered and the zone has a length of
50 seconds. Then each BM would be assigned so many interceptors
and fired upon. Next those in the interval 150 to 200 seconds
from impact would be considered as raid band 2 and the same
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procedure as in previous raid band would be accomplished. By
this raid band method, the entire attack is reordered as to impact
time. Of course it is realized some time would elapse while the
first raid point is being evaluated so the BM's would be continually
changing from time interval to time interval causing the threats
to be changing in each interval. The determination of such a
dynamic programming problem would certainly be an appropriate area
for further research as the threat criteria values determined in
Chapter II remain valid.
Short of developing a dynamic programming solution the idea
can be shown in the following non-linear programming formulation.
The number of interceptors available is fixed and it is assumed that
sufficient interceptors are available. This problem is constrained
by the total number of interceptors that can be controlled by the
radars at any one time. So to formulate this problem, let the
i-th BM be capable of Damage D.. The formulation is,
N
m N.






subj to En. -CR
i = l
]
1 - n. - 3
n. integer
where
N = total number of BM's
m




CR = total number of control radars available
D. = warhead yield times the value of the impact
point for the i-th BM
P = single shot kill probability.
The total number of interceptors available would most likely
be a very loose constraint. A lower bound of 1 is placed on n.
for the same previously stated reasons and the upper bound of
3 is arbitrary but of course would not be unlimited. This upper
bound depends upon CR and P . It should be noted that this
program is static and would essentially allocate interceptors
within a specific raid band.
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IV. SAMPLE PROBLEM
A sample problem will now be presented. This sample problem
shows how one might apply the preceding methodology using a digital
computer. The linear model is used. As this program has been
written, thirty BM's can be ordered. But one need only change
the dimension statement in the computer program and any number
can be ordered. To allow one to follow the computer program,
see Appendix B and the computer program.
Equation 1 and 3 are used and also compared. Since Equation
1 is summing unlike quantities, the magnitude of any particular
piece of data can completely negate another smaller quantity.
In other words if the yield had of been in megatons instead of
kilotons or the time in minutes instead of seconds, the results
would have been quite different.
Three criteria are used, i.e., CI, yield of BM in kilotons;
C2, time to impact in seconds; and C3, value of the impact point.
This example considers six BM's and is depicted in figure 3.
As each BM is detected, the values of CI, C2, and C3 would be
input to the computer in real time. Since equation 3 normalizes
the data, it would first have to be sorted in order to get the
range of the yields, time, and impact values, VI, V2, and V3
respectively. Equation 1 and 3 are then computed and the values
are shown associated with their input data. The weights are then
36
6Q0
Sketch of Sample Program
Figure 3
Legend
400 - 400 Kiloton
V Warhead
350 - 350 Seconds
-> until Impact
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reordered so that BM 1 is the largest threat. One then need
only associate these ordered threats with the respective unordered
weights to determine which data was used to compute the value of
the equations.
A. CASE I, VARYING YIELD, TIME & VALUE
The data labeled with these BM's are threat ordered and the
results are shown in Table 5. Thus for equation 1, the data
corresponding to a 600 kiloton yield, a 200 second predicted
time to impact and an impact value of 2 is determined to be the
largest threat. In this example the same is true using equation
3. For the second largest threat using equation 1, the time
factor is the decisive factor. Equation 3 considers both the
time and the impact value in determining the second largest
threat.
B. CASE II, CONSTANT YIELD
In this case the yields are all the same and have been set
at 500 kilotons. (See Table 6). Equation 1 determines that the
BM with a time of 200 seconds to be the greatest threat. Next
when the times are equal, i.e., 240 seconds, equation 1 then looks
at the V3 value and picks that BM predicted to hit an area with V3
= 2. Thus when the yields are the same, equation 1 takes the
closest BM as the greatest threat and only looks at the value of
the impact point when the times are the same.
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Equation 3 determines the greatest threat to have a time of
260 seconds and predicted to hit an area of value 3. Then
equation 3 drops to that BM which is 200 seconds from impact.
Equation 3 is almost equally concerned with where the BM is
as where it will land.
TABLE 5
THREAT ORDERING WITH VARYING
YIELD, TIME, AND VALUE
VALUE EQ. 1 VALUE EQ. 3 VI V2 V3
11.58 0.03 400. 240. 1
76.76 0.44 600. 200. 2
-19.29 0.14 275. 240. 2
-20.06 0.29 300. 260. 3
-78.36 0.01 200. 350. 3
-66.62 -0.34 250. 350. 1
PRIORITY EQ. 1 ORDERED BM EQ. 3 ORDERED BM
1 76.76 2 0.44 2
2 11.58 1 0.29 4
3 -19.29 3 0.14 3
4 -20.06 4 0.03 1






THREAT ORDERING WITH CONSTANT YIELD
VALUE EQ. 1 VALUE EQ. 3 Vl_ V2 V3
36.58 -0.10 500. 240. 1
51.76 0.19 500. 200. 2
36.96 0.09 500. 240. 2
29.94 0.23 500. 260. 3
-3.36 0.01 500. 350. 3
-4.12 -0.37 500. 350. 1
PRIORITY EQ. 1 ORDERED BM EQ. 3 ORDERED BM
1 51.76 2 0.23 4
2 36.96 3 0.19 2
3 36.58 1 0.09 3
4 29.94 4 0.01 5
5 -3.36 5 -0.10 1
6 -4.12 6 -0.37 6
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C. CASE III, CONSTANT TIME UNTIL IMPACT
In this case the time until impact is constant and is set
at 360 seconds, (see Table 7). As might be expected equation 1
orders the threats according to yield completely as the values
for the impact area is insignificant.
Equation 3 just by coincidence orders 2 BM's as the same
threat because of the range of VI and V3 and the weights of criteria
CI and C3 are averaged out by the criteria values. When the times
are equal one sees that the values of the impact points are the
dominating factors.
D. CASE IV, CONSTANT IMPACT VALUE
For this case the impact values were all set to 3. (see Table
8). Since the magnitude of VI and V2 are about the same, equation
1 and 3 order the BM in the same manner in this case. The time
to impact is the major factor in this case.
It is of interest to note that when the threat weight (TW)
as determined by either equation is positive that the BM's yield
and impact value are the deciding factor, while a negative value
implies that the time to impact is the major factor.
It is apparent from the four cases that equation 3 is far






























































THREAT ORDERING WITH CONSTANT IMPACT VALUE
VALUE EQ. 1 VALUE EQ. 3 VI V2 V3
12.34 0.03 400. 240. 3
77.14 0.25 600. 200. 3
-18.91 -0.05 275. 240. 3
-20.06 -0.09 300. 260. 3
-78.36 -0.37 200. 350. 3
-65.86 -0.34 250. 350. 3
PRIORITY EQ. 1 ORDERED BM EQ. 3 ORDERED BM
1 77.14 2 0.25 2
2 12.34 1 0.03 1
3 -18.91 3 -0.05 3
4 -20.06 4 -0.09 4
5 -65.86 6 -0.34 6
6 -78.36 5 -0.37 5
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS :
The problem of how can an ABM system minimize damage from an
enemy nuclear strike has been examined. The characteristics of
an effective defensive system have been identified as having:
(1) Many more interceptors than enemy missile
capabil i ty
(2) As many control radars as possible
(3) High system effectiveness (probability of
intercept) per individual missile
This study has shown that even though there are many move
interceptors than enemy missiles, all defensive resources cannot
be simultaneously deployed due to the constraints of interceptor
guidance systems (control radars). Thus, priorities must be
established for the engagement of incoming enemy missiles.
Those criteria found to be the most important in determining
which ballistic missile to fire at are the yield of the warhead,
the predicted impact point, and the time remaining until the
ballistic missile impacts.
Since the overall objective for wanting to threat order
ballistic missiles is to minimize the expected damage in an attack,
the allocation of interceptors plays an important part. There are
a number of methods by which this may be done, two of which have
been discussed. In the first method, the ballistic missile's are
threat ordered according to yield, time to impact, and impact
point. Then a fixed number interceptors, e.g., two, are fired at
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each ballistic missile according to its ordered threat weight. The
underlying assumption is that not enough missile control radars or
control units exist to fire at all ballistic missiles at once. As
soon as a control radar is freed, it takes on the largest threat
still unengaged.
For the second method, a non-linear programming problem with
integer constraints was formulated. Again the problem is con-
strained by the number of control radars. But this method is
different from the first one in that the number of interceptors
is not fixed. Expected damage is still minimized using the same
criteria as in the first method. A damage coefficient is computed
by multiplying the yield of the warhead times the impact point
value. The time before impact is used to place the ballistic
missile in so-called raid points using time intervals, e. g.,
150-200 seconds.
There are almost an unlimited number of extensions that one
might look at in the area of threat ordering. The most obvious
would be to subdivide the general situation as discussed in this
paper into specific scenarios. This would mean looking at those
defensive areas located on the boundaries and those in the
interior. This would mean looking at two or more defensive areas
together and determining how best to coordinate the effort for the
overall defense of the country.
One could also extend this thesis to see what criteria and
weights should be used when the attack consists of not only
ICBWs, but MIRV's, FOBS's, and SLBM's.
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Although time did not permit, it was the author's intention
to develope a threat subroutine written in Fortran to the extent
that it would be used in a simulation model. The Mixed Air Battle
Simulation (MABS), version IV, was obtained from Stanford Research
Institute. [Ref. 11]. This simulates simultaneous surface-to-air
missiles, antiaircraft artillery, and interceptor defense
operations. Specifically, 100 ballistics missiles can be simulated,
A threat routine is present in this simulation, but is mainly con-
cerned with the aircraft threat. It should prove of interest to
compare the original simulation with one in which a threat routine









The threat constituted by enemy aircraft is such that time
is usually available to analyze the attack as it is taking place.
A misjudgment on the part of a controller can usually be corrected
without greatly degrading the defense. With the threat of a
ballistic missile (BM) attack, however, this valuable time is lost.
Picture the following situation. A group of BM's are approach-
ing in a tight formation, but not so tight that our defense can
destroy the group with one ABM. We must determine an order by
which the BM's are intercepted. This problem is known as "threat
ordering".
Threat ordering is defined as the determination of criteria
and the relevant weight of these criteria so that a threat can be
ranked as to the highest threat, next highest, etc. Once the most
important criteria are determined, weights must be assigned. It
is then possible to relate these different criteria and weights
in some functional form. Our overall defense doctrine would then
be to intercept that BM having the highest value.
The determination of the best criteria to use and their
weights are partly subjective. In a thesis I am preparing these
threat criteria and weights are required. Your opinion is re-
quested in the following areas on the next page.
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A. The following criteria have been listed in a random order.
You are to assign weights between and 100 in such a manner
that the criteria are ranked.
Criteria weight
1. Likely warhead size as determined
by radar cross-section
2. BM's range from the defended area
3. Number of interceptors that we can
launch at a BM before it detonates
4. Predicted point of BM detonation
5. Number of batteries able to fire
at the BM
B. List any criterion you feel should be considered
that is not on A above and assign a weight as though








GLOSSARY OF FORTRAN NAMES
The following is a list of Fortran variable names in order
of their appearance in the example program.
VI THE YIELD'S OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE IN KILOTON
E. G., 400. THE ARRAY IS SORTED BY "SHSORT"
V2 THE TIME BEFORE IMPACT IN SECONDS, E.G., 240. THE
ARRAY OF NUMBERS TO BE SORTED BY "SHSORT".
V3 THE VALUE OF THE IMPACT POINT ON A SCALE OF 1 , 2,
OR 3, E. G., 1. THE ARRAY OF NUMBERS TO BE SORTED.
THE ARRAY IS SORTED BY "SHSORT".
NBM NUMBER OF ENEMY BALLISTIC MISSILES, E. G., 6.
BM NUMBER OF VALUES IN ARRAYS "VI", "VA1", ETC.
VA1(1) ARRAY, DIMENSIONED AT LEAST NBM IN CALLING PROGRAM,
TO BE FILLED WITH INTEGERS FROM 1 TO BM. AFTER EXIT
FROM SUBROUTINE "SHSORT", VA1(1) WILL CONTAIN THE
ORIGINAL INDEX OF THE LARGEST ELEMENT OF "VI". VA
(2) WILL CONTAIN THE ORIGINAL INDEX OF THE NEXT-TO-
LARGEST ELEMENT OF "VI", etc. VAl(BM) WILL CONTAIN
THE ORIGINAL INDEX OF THE SMALLEST ELEMENT OF "VI".
VA2(1) SAME AS VA1
VS3(1) SAME AS VA1
WEIG(1 ) SAME AS VA1
1(1) SAME AS VA1
XI ( 1 ) CONTAINS THE ORIGINAL VALUE OF THE V1(1)TH VARIABLE
AFTER IT HAS BEEN SORTED
X2(l) SAME AS XI (1)
X3(l) SAME AS XI (1)
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SHS0RT(V1,VA1,NBM) USED TO SORT, IN DECENDING ORDER, AN ARRAY
OF SINGLE PRECISION REAL NUMBERS AND TO PRODUCE AN
ARRAY OF INDEXES SO USER CAN RE-ORDER OTHER
CORRESPONDING INFORMATION ACCORDING TO DECENDING
VALUES OF "VI".
Dl THE ORIGINAL VALUE, XI, MINUS THE SMALLEST ELEMENT
OF VI, ALL DIVIDED BY THE RANGE, Dl
.
D2, A2 SAME AS Dl and Al
D3, A3 SAME AS Dl and Al
WN(1) EQUATION 3
W(l) EQUATION 1
XW(1) CONTAINS THE ORIG
REORDERED BY "SHSORT"






UNRANKED RAU CRTTFRTA DATA
CI C2 C3 C4 C5
1 50 25 35 100 25
2 50 95 75 100 60
3 70 80 20 90 20
4 50 75 40 90 40
5 10 50 75 60 65
6 50 100 80 90 70
7 75 90 70 50 45
8 80 90 20 70 10
9 100 30 60
C & GS
1 40 10 90 60 80
2 10 85 90 90 30
3 10 20 30 15 25
4 60 40 100 50 70
5 70 100 50 75 40
6 10 100 80 90 30
7 10 80 79 90 78
8 60 100 80 90 70
9 90 95 91 85 80
10 40 90 75 80 60
11 90 80 60 100 50
12 100 50 75
13 25 75 50 75 40
14 50 70 40 100 30
15 70 80 50 75 65
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1RTRAN PROGRAM
PROGRAM ShCfeING USE J COMPARISON GF FC. 1 AND EQ. '
DIMENSION Vl( . , V2( 3C) ,V3< 31) , VAI ( 3C) ,VA2U: ,VA3(30)
*,M30) ,WEIG(.: NE/FIC(30 >,nN(iC> ,kNN( 30 ) , WE fcN ( 30 ) ,
*X1( 30) ,X2( 30) : > 30) , XW
{
30) ,XWN( iC)
INTEGER V/1,V A 3 , Vi E I G , WNN , BM
YIELT CE WEAPCIS iN KILCTCNS
f> VI /--Or ,,. C. ,2 75., 30 0. ,2 GO. ,z5J./
V2: TINE BEFORi IMPflCT GF EM
DATA V2/24 ,20C»,240., 2,60. ,350.. ,353./
V 3 : VALLE CF I iv M V AREA
DATA V3/1 . , 2 ,, ., 3. ,3., 1./
NEM = 6
BM = G
DC 10 I = 1 , N 3 M
V ' 1 ( I > = I
VA2( I ) = I
VA3( I ) = I
K E I G ( I ) I
1 J WNN( 1 ) = I
DC 11 1 = 1 ,MM
X 1 ( I ) = V 1 ( I )
X 2 ( I ) = V 2 ( I )
11 X31 I )=V3( I )
('.All SHSOkTI V 1 , VA1 ,NBN)
CALL c.hSORT{ V 2, V A 2, NOV)
CALL iHSCRT ( V3,VA3,NBN)
DC 12 I=1,N3M









25 A2 (X2< I)-V'(8M )/C2




29 A3=(X3< I)-V3(8M) )/C3
ECLATIOh 3
30 KMI)=.25*A1 -.37*A2 .?R*A4
ECLATICfS 1
12 W<I)=.25*XlU)-.3 7*X2tI)+.33*X3lI)
nc 50 : =i ,nbm
XM I )=w(I )
5C XWNU ) *N( I )
CALL ?HSGRT( W , W F IG,NBM )
CALL r nSCFT (^,*NN, \BN)
WPITt >,4C)
40 FCPMA1 <////// ,13X, 'v/ALUt E3. l'.cX, 'VALUE FQ. 3',7X,
*= , Vi , ,6X,»V2 , ,6X,•V3 , ,//)
DC 41 1-1 ^BW
WRlTE(o,42) Xrt(I),XWN(I),Xl(I),X2(I),X3(I)
42 FCRNAT (^X,F9. 2,fc}X,P9.2 , 9 X , F4 . n , 4X , F4 .0 , 4X ,F4 .0 )
41 CONTINUE
K P I T E ( 6 , 4 3 )
4 3 FORMA! { // /,20X, 'Bf ,3X , 'EC 1 CRDERED«»7X,
*• EC. 3 ORDERED',///)
DC 44 1 = 1, NBM






c tJPRPUT!MP SHCppTf A f i^py, /N/)
fSlMEW^IPN' A! N) ,KFY(N)
(- **\-*\ *?







22 on i j = i ,k
I! = J
11 IM=H*MM
!F(A( IM)-A( t T) ) 1 ,l,3i,
IrQ Tcyp = 4 f I T )
TT=KFY< y t )




K^Y( I I )=KFY( IM)
^ ( T M) =TTMO
KFY( JM)=t t
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